The orthodox presentation of quantum theory often includes statements on state preparation and measurements without mentioning how these processes can be achieved. The often quoted projection postulate is regarded by many as problematical. This paper presents a systematic framework for state preparation and measurement. Within the existing Hilbert space formulation of quantum mechanics for spinless particles we show that it is possible (1)to prepare an arbitrary state and (2)to reduce all quantum measurements to local position measurements in an asymptotic way (...) by unitary evolution processes without recourse to the projection postulate. A generalization to spin-1/2particles is also given. The theory presented provides a general mathematical and theoretical foundation for many practical schemes for state preparation and measurement. (shrink)

In the present paper we give a precise definition of a hidden-variable theory for quantum mechanics, whereby we adopt the weakest possible definition of a hidden-variable theory, which is compatible with the assumption that the bounded observables of a quantum mechanical system are represented by the elements of the real part Ar of a W*-algebra A (of the most general type) and the states are represented by the “normal states” (in the mathematical sense) of A. We then go on to (...) show that an example put forward by Bell in 1966 satisfies our definition (Sec. 2). Finally we make use of Bell's famous theorem to show that for a sufficiently non-commutative W*-algebra A no hidden-variable theory in our sense exists (Theorem 3.3 and its corollaries). (shrink)

Steve Biko died in detention in South Africa in 1977. Critical ethical issues are raised both by the conduct of the doctors responsible for Biko's care and by the subsequent response of the medical profession as a whole. Because those issues are relevant to all healthcare professionals everywhere, the Biko affair provides a useful case study in medical ethics. We discuss the case in this article, describing how we use it in our teaching.

Steve Biko died in detention in South Africa in 1977. Critical ethical issues are raised both by the conduct of the doctors responsible for Biko's care and by the subsequent response of the medical profession as a whole. Because those issues are relevant to all healthcare professionals everywhere, the Biko affair provides a useful case study in medical ethics. We discuss the case in this article, describing how we use it in our teaching.

Antipathy towards the possibility that God exists is a common attitude, which has recently been clearly expressed by Thomas Nagel. This attitude is presumably irrelevant to the question whether God does exist. But it raises two other interesting philosophical issues. First, to what extent does this attitude motivate irrational belief? And secondly, how should the attitude be evaluated? This paper investigates that latter issue. Is the hope that God does not exist a morally proper hope? I simplify this question by (...) interpreting the relevant attitude as an aversion towards the Christian picture of the world coupled with a preference for the naturalist atheistic picture. And comparing the content of those two world pictures, I argue that the attitude, though partly explicable, is morally unjustifiable, for clearly recognisable reasons. Regardless, then, of further concerns about the doxastic influence of this attitude, we ought to be ashamed of our antipathy to God, which reflects badly upon us. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;An explanation of the possibility of empirical knowledge must establish how there could be an adequately non-accidental connection between our beliefs and the truth about the independent external world, and how this could be a connection in which we have good reason to believe. ;Foundationalist theories of justification offer the most promise of establishing this connection. But the best recent foundationalist theories fail. Even the allegedly basic judgements of (...) the content of one's sensory experience are not utterly secure. And neither are these judgements shown to provide adequate support for our perceptual judgements. Critical cognitivism manages only to describe, and not to establish the entitlement, of procedures we ordinarily take to be justificatory. Arguments for the thesis that judgements of the sensory content of our experiences provide criteria for our perceptual judgements turn out to be unsound, as do Michael Dummett's arguments for the thesis that we could not understand the sentences in which our perceptual judgements are couched unless we were able to recognize truth-conditions of these sentences whenever those conditions obtain. And arguments for the view that perceptual judgements provide the best explanation of our experiences fail even to establish the probability of our empirical judgements. ;Nor does epistemological naturalism disclose any reason to regard ourselves as entitled to dispense with the requirement that we establish a justificatory explanation of our beliefs. ;However, belief in a non-deceiving God does offer a good, and indeed a uniquely good, explanation of the non-accidental connection between our empirical judgements and the truth. Even if it cannot be demonstrated, the theistic explanation must be postulated if we are to possess the required foundational grounds for our natural faith in the reliability of those presuppositions by which we guide ourselves in forming the beliefs we are most inclined to call knowledge. (shrink)

International array of contributors, bringing together both traditional and more recent approaches to provide valuable insights into the poets’ use of language.Covers authors from Lucilius to Juvenal.Of the peoples of ancient Italy, only the Romans committed newly composed poems to writing, and for 250 years Latin-speakers developed an impressive verse literature.The language had traditional resources of high style, e.g., alliteration, lexical and morphological archaism or grecism, and of course metaphor and word order; and there were also less obvious resources in (...) the technical vocabularies of law, philosophy and medicine.The essays in this volume show how the poets in the classical period combined these elements, and so created a poetic medium that could comprehend satire, invective, erotic elegy, drama, lyric, and the grandest heroic epos. (shrink)

Hans Spemann's use of the concept double assurance, drawn from engineering models in cytology, is discussed in his work on lens development and the action of the organizer. His transformation of this concept within his neo-Lamarckian program is demonstrated and connected with the cultural factors which shaped engineering and embryology in Weimar Germany.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

Mr Olding's recent attack on my exposition of the argument from design gives me an opportunity to defend the central theses of my original article. My article pointed out that there were arguments from design of two types—those which take as their premisses regularities of copresence and those which take as their premisses regularities of succession. I sought to defend an argument of the second type. One merit of such an argument is that there is no doubt about the truth (...) of its premisses. Almost all objects in the world behave in a highly regular way describable by scientific laws. Further, any scientific explanation of such a regularity must invoke some more general regularity. The most general regularities of all are, as such, scientifically inexplicable. The question arises whether there is a possible explanation of another kind which can be provided for them, and whether their occurrence gives any or much support to that explanation. I urged that we do explain some phenomena by explanation of an entirely different kind from the scientific. We explain states of affairs by the action of agents who bring them about intentionally of their own choice. Regularities of succession, as well as other phenomena may be explained in this way. Explanation of this kind I will term intentional explanation. Intentional explanation of some phenomenon E consists in adducing an agent A who brought E about of his own choice and a further end G which, he believed, would be forwarded by the production of E. (shrink)

An alleged moral right to informational privacy assumes that we should have control over information about ourselves. What is the philosophical justification for this control? I think that one prevalent answer to this question—an answer that has to do with the justification of negative rights generally—will not do.